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2 - Bessen – Value of U.S. Patents
Patent value is an interesting economic quantity for several reasons: it informs policy because it
is a measure of the reward that the patent system provides inventors; it aids accounting for the value of
intangibles; it helps measure the productivity and quality of R&D.
This paper extends the research on patent value by estimating the renewal value of U.S. patents
using a rich set of control variables including patent citation statistics, whether the patent was litigated
or reissued, the type of patent assignee and technology, and, for a sub-sample of patents issued to
publicly listed firms, details of the patent owner’s financial and other characteristics, patent portfolio
size, R&D, and industry. This extension allows quantitative assessment of the association between
patent citations and patent value, more accurate estimation of the subsidy that patents provide to
perform R&D, and better understanding of variation in patent value across different types of inventors.
This approach combines two strands of the literature. One strand uses data on patent renewal
decisions to estimate the value of holding a patent.1 The implicit value of a patent is revealed when its
owner pays a renewal fee, implying that the patent is worth more than the fee required to keep it in
force. Subject to some important assumptions, this approach has been used to obtain dollar estimates of
patents. However, most of this research only looks at the aggregate value of patents. Schankerman
(1998) and Lanjouw (1998) look at patent value by technology category and nationality of the patentee
for French and German patents, respectively. But many other factors that might reasonably influence
patent value have not been explored in this context.
The other strand of the literature looks at the relationship between patent value and a variety of
patent characteristics with an eye to measuring patent quality, to developing quality-adjusted measures
of inventive output and to estimating the contribution of intangibles to firm value. These studies look at
correlations between patent characteristics and variables that should be correlated with patent value
such as whether a patent is litigated or opposed (Harhoff et al. 2003b, Allison et al. 2004, Lanjouw and
Schankerman 2004a, Marco 2005), survey measures of subjective value (Harhoff et al. 1999, 2003a),
the number of countries in which the patentee files (Putnam 1996, Lanjouw and Schankerman 2004a),
whether the patent is renewed (Harhoff et al. 2003b, Lanjouw and Schankerman 2004a), and firm
market value (Hall et al. 2005). Based on such correlations, researchers infer, for example, that the
number of citations made to a patent is associated with that patent’s value. However, these studies
recognize that the relationship between citations and patent value is “noisy” and they have not
quantified the actual increase in value associated with an incremental citation received.
1 See Lanjouw et al. 1998 for a review of this literature. Recent additions include Baudry and Dumont (2006), Gustafsson
(2005) and Serrano (2006).
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This paper integrates these two approaches. Because a rich set of data is available about U.S.
patents, I can combine information about patent renewals with information about the owner and patent
characteristics. I model patentees’ decisions to renew as a kind of ordered probit—patent renewal fees
increase sharply with the age of the patent, sorting the patents by value over time. Variables such as
patent citations and firm characteristics can be included on the right hand side of the corresponding
regression. The latent variable that represents the patentee’s valuation is a linear combination of such
characteristics and a stochastic error term. In effect, previous studies have only included a constant and
an error term on the right hand side.
There are several advantages to including patent characteristics and owner characteristics in a
renewal model of patent value. Using this model, I am able to obtain dollar estimates of the incremental
effect of patent citations and other characteristics on patent value. I am also able to estimate how much
of the total variance in log patent value is explained by such characteristics. I find, in general, that these
characteristics are significantly correlated with patent value but they do not explain much of the overall
variation. That is, as other researchers have concluded, these are rather noisy measures of value.
Citation statistics may be more informative about the value of the underlying technology than they are
about the value of the patent per se.
In addition, this approach allows me to measure separately other factors that influence patent
value such as the type and firm size of the patentee or the size of the patentee’s patent portfolio. I find
substantial differences in patent value, for example, between small and large patentees. This has
important implications for policy and for what it implies about about the market for patent licenses.
This finer-grained information about patent owners also allows me to obtain more accurate
estimates of the value that patents provide as incentives to perform R&D. Mark Schankerman (1998)
argues that the ratio of patent value to the value of the associated R&D is an “equivalent subsidy
rate”—under some assumptions, this ratio represents an upper bound on the subsidy that would be
needed to elicit the same level of R&D in a world without patent protection. Several patent renewal
studies have estimated this ratio either for the aggregate patents of a nation or by technology class,
using highly aggregated data. Because I can closely match the value of patents to the value of R&D on
a firm-by-firm basis, I am able to obtain more representative estimates of the equivalent subsidy rate.
Patent renewal data has been used previously to obtain estimates of the value of U.S. patents by
Serrano (2006), who obtains preliminary estimates of the value of a subset of U.S. patents using patent
renewal and re-assignment data, and by Barney (2002), who reports few details. Kimberly Moore
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(2006) reports general features of U.S. patent renewal data.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section presents a model of patent renewal and
discusses theoretical issues; Section 2 describes the data, and Section 3 presents results for patents
issued in 1991 and for a panel of patents issued to public manufacturing firms from 1985-91. Section 4
compares my estimates with those obtained by other researchers, including estimates relative to R&D
spending. Section 4 also discusses the significance of the low patent values for small patentees and
Section 5 concludes.

1. Model of Patent Renewal and Value
1.1 Patent Value
Researchers have used measures of patent value for a variety of different purposes, including
measuring inventive output, measuring the incentive effect of patents, and measuring the contribution
of intangibles to firm value. Different uses can imply different definitions and different methods of
measurement, so it is helpful to set out some initial distinctions (see Harhoff et al. 2003b for a different
set of distinctions).
I aim to estimate the value of incremental rents that patents earn. Patents can provide their
owners a degree of market power that conveys a stream of profits that exceeds the profits they could
earn without patents. These profits can be realized either through the ability to exclude others from
product markets, in which case product prices rise above the level without patents, or through the
ability to exclude others in the markets for technology licensing or sale. This notion of patent value
corresponds to the “reward” theory of patents—patent rents are the reward.
The value of patent rents, however, is distinct from the value of the underlying technology. This
divergence occurs for two reasons. First, innovators also appropriate value from technology by nonpatent means such as lead-time advantage and trade secrecy. The value of patent rents is incremental,
that is, it is measured relative to an alternative value appropriated by these other means. In general, not
all of the inventions nor all of the technical knowledge of a new technology is protected by a patent, so
in general, the value of a technology exceeds the value of the associated patents.
Second, the value of patents is, to some extent, endogenous. Patentees can exert varying degrees
of effort in the prosecution of patents and in their enforcement. This effort at patent “refinement”
affects the strength of the patent rights and hence the value of the rents derived. For instance, patent
applicants can invest more effort in drafting a patent by including more claims (to broaden the scope of
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the claims and to make them more resistant to invalidation challenges) and more citations (to immunize
the patent against possible prior art). Patent owners can strengthen patent claims by obtaining a reissued patent. Innovators can also obtain more patents on a technology and related technologies. A
larger number of patents may simply reflect that an owner is protecting more inventions with patents,
or that owner may be “fencing” off the technology by patenting possible substitute technologies or
building a patent “thicket.” Below I find evidence that patentees do increase aggregate patent value
through such measures.
This endogeneity means that variation in the value of technologies does not necessarily
correspond closely to the variation in patent rents. A firm with highly valuable technology may obtain
relatively more patents on that technology, so that the average value of rents per patent does not
entirely reflect the value of the technology. This means that patent value, in the sense used in this
paper, does not serve well as a measure of “inventive output.” It will, in general, be less than the value
of the underlying technology, although these two measures are likely correlated.

1.2 Patent Renewal
The model I use is a simple variant of the model initially developed by Pakes and Schankerman
(1984). Patentees derive rents from their patents only so long as those patents remain in force. If the
expected stream of rents is not larger than the fees required to keep the patent in force, patent owners
will let the patent expire. This means that patent renewal and expiration decisions implicitly reflect the
value of the associated rents. Let ri(t) be the annual flow of rents for the ith patent at time t.
Following the literature, I assume that this profit flow depreciates at a constant rate, d, so that
ri t

ri 0 e

dt

. A patent might depreciate because of technological obsolescence (the underlying

invention becomes less valuable) or because competitors are able to “invent around” the patent.
Although constant depreciation is a common assumption, there are several reasons why the actual
depreciation pattern might deviate from it. First, there is some evidence of a “learning” effect where
patent value actually increases during the first few years after the patent issues. Pakes (1986) and
Lanjouw (1998) find evidence of this, however, they also find that this effect is largely complete by the
end of the fourth year after issue. Since my first observation occurs at the end of the fourth year, this
effect means that my estimates may have a small upward bias. Another deviation may occur because of
economic shocks that occur during a given renewal year. For instance, Schankerman (1998) finds
evidence of oil shocks in French patent renewal data. To control for such shocks, I run one set of
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regressions over panel data with dummies for different cohorts. Finally, some groups of patentees, such
as foreign patentees, might experience a different time pattern of depreciation. I discuss this below.
Profit flow may also be a function of observable characteristics of the patent or of the patent’s
owner. Let Xi be a vector of such characteristics such that
ln ri 0

(1)

Xi

i

,

where

is a normally distributed stochastic error with zero mean and standard deviation

ln ri 0

N

X i,

such that

. In most of the renewal literature, Xi is treated as a simple constant.2 In this case,

three parameters are estimated, d, , and the constant mean, and these are sufficient to determine the
median and mean values of patents. However, my data permit Xi to also include characteristics of the
patents, such as citations received, and characteristics of the owner. Then estimates permit calculation
of the direct dollar value effect of citations and these other characteristics.
The assumption of a lognormal distribution is also common, but not uncontroversial. Researchers
find that a lognormal generally fits the distribution of invention values well (Harhoff et al. 2003a) and
patent renewal data are consistent with a lognormal distribution as well (Pakes and Schankerman
1984). However, much of the total value of patents derives from the upper tail of the distribution. Since
the most valuable patents are renewed to full term, their value is not directly registered in the patent
expiration data. This means that estimates of mean patent value based on patent renewal data are
extrapolations, although estimates of median value are typically not. In a related paper (Bessen 2006) I
check these estimates of patent renewal value by estimating the contribution of patent rents to the
market value of public firms.

1.3 Estimation
The observations in the data set concern patentees’ decisions whether to pay renewal fees to keep
their patents in force for additional time periods. Patents applied for on or after December 11, 1980,
accrue fees after 3.5, 7.5 and 11.5 years in order to remain in force beyond 4 years, 8 years and 12
years, respectively. The fee schedules vary over time and they also depend on whether the assignee has
“small entity” status—small firms, individuals and non-profit organizations pay fees that are only half
of those paid by “large entities.”
As in Europe, the fees increase with the age of the patent, that is, 12th year fees are much large
than 4th year fees. This is important because it means that the patentees’ optimal renewal decision rule
2 Putnam (1996) and Harhoff et al. (2003b) use a multivariate approach in slightly different contexts.
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need only consider the current renewal period. That is, it is straightforward to show that if a patentee
finds it unprofitable to renew at year 4, it will be even more unprofitable to renew at years 8 and 12, so
an optimal rule will be to renew if and only if it is profitable to renew for the next immediate period.
Specifically, if the payment of the fee keeps the patent in force for T more years at time t, then the
patentee will renew the ith patent if and only if the present value of profits during those T years exceeds
the renewal fee, cit.
The present value of profits from t to t+T, is
t T

(2)
t

ri

e

ri 0 zt , where

s

zt

e

dt

1

e
d

d s T

,

s

and s is the discount rate. I follow the literature and use a discount rate of 10% per annum. Then the
decision rule is to renew if and only if
(3)

ln ri 0

ln

ci t
zt

.

Given the lognormal distribution and substituting (1) into (3), the probabilities that a patent will expire
at each given year are
ln ci 4 z4

P patent i expires at 4
P patent i expires at 8

(4)

P patent i expires at 12
P patent i expires at 17

where

Xi

ln ci 4 z4

1
1
1

ln ci 8 z8
ln ci 12 z12

Xi

ln ci 8 z8

Xi

ln ci 12 z12

Xi
Xi

Xi

is the cumulative standard normal distribution function. This structure is, in fact, the same as

that of an ordered probit, with the additional estimation of d (z is a function of d; also,

here provides

more than just a scaling constant). I estimate this model by maximizing the likelihood function implied
by (4). That is, each patent’s contribution to the log likelihood function is the log of the right hand side
given in (4) corresponding to that patent’s expiration date.

1.4 Calculating Patent Value
To estimate the net present value of patents, I perform a Monte Carlo simulation using the actual
data. With estimates of the parameters,

,

, and d , in hand, I first determine bounds on

i

for the ith

observation conditional on observed renewal decisions made for that patent. For example, if the ith
patent was allowed to expire after eight years, then
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(5)

ln

ci 4
z4 d

Xi

i

ln

ci 8

Xi

z8 d

For each observation in each Monte Carlo iteration, I select
lognormal distribution determined by

and

i

as a random draw from the

, conditional on (5) (or the corresponding bounds for

patents with different expiration dates). Given this random draw, I calculate the corresponding ln ri 0 ,
and, from this, the present value of the patent at the time of issuance net of the discounted value of
renewal fees that will be paid. I repeat the Monte Carlo iterations a sufficient number of times so that
the total number of observations exceeds 500,000.

2. Data
2.1 Samples
This study uses two datasets. The first consists of almost all U.S. utility patents issued in 1991
(patents assigned to governments and foreign individuals are excluded). The second is a panel of
patents issued from 1985 through 1991 and assigned to publicly listed, R&D-performing firms whose
primary line of business is in a manufacturing industry.
I used 1991 as the terminal year because this is the last year for which the final patent renewal
decision could be observed (in 2003) when this research began.3 Patents applied for before December
11, 1980 are exempt from renewal fees. Because of this 1985 was the earliest year with few such
exempt patents.
I obtained patent expiration data from the website of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO).4 This data also included the patent’s “entity” status at the time each fee was paid. The PTO
designates individuals, small businesses and non-profit organizations as “small” entities. For most
patents, the renewal fees for small entities were half those for large entities. In addition, the fee
schedule was changed regularly and the fee for any given patent also depended on its issue date and, in
some cases, on its application date.5 Some patents were reissued—a procedure where the patent owner
can modify patent claims. I tracked reissues through to their final expiration as well. A small number of
patents are reported as having missed a payment, but have petitioned to have the patent reinstated. I
3 Patentees who miss the deadline for paying the fees are given a grace period during which they can pay with a penalty.
They can also appeal expirations arising from missed payments.
4 https://ramps.uspto.gov/eram/patentMaintFees.do
5 I obtained the details of the fee schedule over time from the Federal Register and Public Laws. This information is
available from the author.
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record these as if the last reported payment had been made.
Of the 96,513 patents issued in 1991, I obtained patent expiration information on 94,343. I
excluded 1,962 patents issued to governments or foreign individuals. Also, 33 patents were applied for
before December 11, 1980 and were thus exempt from renewal fees. This left 175 patents that I could
not find in the PTO’s database.
In addition to this data for 1991, I assembled a panel of firm data to explore additional variables
and to explore the regressions over time. To this end, I assembled a panel of patents owned by publicly
listed manufacturing firms from 1985 through 1991. I drew this panel dataset from a larger sample
developed for another project (Bessen and Meurer 2005) that matched patent data to firms in the
Compustat dataset of firm financial information. The USPTO provides an assignee name for every
assigned patent after 1969. To match the USPTO assignee name to the Compustat firm name, we began
with the match file provided by the NBER (Hall et al. 2001). To this we added matches on subsidiaries
developed by Bessen and Hunt (2004), we manually matched names for large patenters and R&Dperformers, and we matched a large number of additional firms using a name-matching program. In
addition, using data on mergers and acquisitions from SDC, we tracked patent assignees to their
acquiring firms. Since a public firm may be acquired, yet still receive patents as a subsidiary of its
acquirer, we matched patents assigned to an acquired entity in a given year to the firm that owned that
entity in that year. 6 The matched group of firms accounts for 96% of the R&D performed by all U.S.
Compustat firms, 77% of all R&D-reporting firms listed in Compustat and 62% of all patents issued to
domestic non-governmental organizations during the sample period. Sample statistics show that this
sample is broadly representative of the entire Compustat sample, although it is slightly weighted
toward larger and incumbent firms.
From this larger sample, I selected a panel of firms from 1985 through 1991 that had a primary
line of business in a manufacturing industry, that performed R&D, and that had at least four years of
non-missing data in key variables. The left me with a sample of 107,364 patents issued during this time
period to 1,066 firms.

6 This dynamic matching process is different from that used in the original NBER data set which statically matched a
patent assignee to a Compustat firm. These data were developed with the help of Megan MacGarvie, to whom I am
indebted.

10 - Bessen – Value of U.S. Patents

3 Regression Results
3.1 Patent Value by Groups
Table 1 shows summary expiration and renewal data by major groups for the 1991 sample.
Overall, only 41.52% of patents were renewed to full term, with roughly equal groups dropping out at
each renewal stage. The mean renewal fees were not large, however, increasing from $814 after four
years, to $1,562 after eight years, to a final mean payment of $2,327. About 29% of the patents were
issued to patentees who were “small entities” at year four. In most cases, these patentees pay fees that
are half as large as those paid by large entities.
Among assignee types, patents that were unassigned at issue or issued to individuals had the
lowest rate of renewal to term, 22%, while publicly listed U.S. firms had the highest rate, 50%.
Relatively few publicly listed U.S. firms and foreign organizations rated as small entities. Similarly,
patents awarded to small entities in general were much more likely to expire despite lower fees—only
25% were renewed to full term compared to 48% for patents held by large entities.
Table 1 also shows these variables for six technology categories defined by Hall et al. (2001),
based on each patent’s primary technology class as assigned by the PTO. Computer and
communications patents had the highest rate of renewal to full term, while “other” technologies had the
lowest rate. Drug and medical patents had the highest proportion of small entity patents, many of these
from inventors making medical devices.
Table 2, column 1, shows a basic regression for all U.S. patentees (excluding patents assigned to
foreigners and governments). Because fees differ sharply depending on the patentee’s entity status and
because there may also be important differences between large and small entities, I control for small
entity status in all regressions. Of course, entity status can change over time. Small firms grow and,
more frequently, valuable patents owned by small patentees are acquired by large firms. These
regressions include a dummy variable if the patentee was a small entity in year four, and dummies if
the entity status changed (up or down) from year four to year twelve. I also estimate

and the

depreciation rate and I report median and mean net present values for these patents calculated using the
Monte Carlo technique described above.
The estimates for

(1.86) and the depreciation rate (14%) are broadly similar to the

corresponding parameters found in studies of European patents. However, the means are quite
different, generating much higher patent values. I estimate a mean value for patents granted to US
patentees of $78,168 and a median value of $7,175, also in 1992 U.S. dollars. In Section 4, below, I
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compare these estimates to those obtained by other researchers.
The coefficients on the entity size dummy variables suggest that patents owned by small entities
are dramatically less valuable than patents owned by large entities. This is confirmed by separate
regressions in columns 2 and 3 for patentees who were small and large entities in year four,
respectively, although the difference in the means is not as great as the fivefold difference in the
median values or the implied profit flows. Also, the small number of patents that were owned in year
four by a small entity but owned by a large entity in year 12 were substantially more valuable than
most other patents.7 This suggests a selection effect: the most valuable patents owned by small entities
are acquired by large entities.
A similar selection effect may explain part of the reason small entity patents in year four are less
valuable than large entity patents—some patents initially issued to small entities are acquired by large
entities by year four. I do not have data on the initial status of each patent. However, the aggregate
numbers on small entity patents suggest that this selection effect is not large because relatively few
patents are transferred during this interval. At issuance, 30.17% of 1991 patents were owned by small
entities while 29.33% were at year four.8 Assuming, say, that patents transferred to large entities have a
log profit flow that is 3.93 larger (Column 2), then counting the patents that transferred would mean
that the log profit flow of small entity patents was only 1.81 less than the log profit flow of large
entities at issuance.
In simpler words, patents owned by individuals, small companies and non-profit organizations
have much lower values than those owned by large companies even after taking into account a
selection effect. This is important because it is sometimes argued that patents are particularly valuable
to small patentees, since large firms may have more alternatives to patent protection, such as
complementary products or services. These results suggest, instead, that patents do a relatively poorer
job of earning returns for small inventors compared to large firms.
I explore this further in Table 3, which looks at regressions by assignee type. Individual
assignees, including patents that were not assigned at issue (and therefore owned by the individual
inventors by default), have the lowest patent values, $25,598 in the mean. Patent values from
organizational inventors (mostly firms) are larger, as seen in columns 2 and 3. Interestingly, the
distribution for non-public organizations appears to be more highly skewed than the distribution for
7 Among the 24,015 patents owned by small U.S. entities in year four, 1,309 were owned by large entities in year twelve.
8 The latter number comes from Table 1. The former is derived from data on 1991 issuance fees in Lehman (1993). Large
entity issuance fees for utility patents collected were $67,122 and small entity issuance fees, at half the rate, were
$29,004 (in thousands). 29004/(29004 + 67122/2) = .3017.
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public firms, generating a higher mean value despite a lower median value. But the lower values of
patents owned by small entities is not just a matter of individual inventors—similar relative values are
found across all types of assignees. In Section 4.3 below, I discuss the significance of this apparently
robust effect.
Finally, foreign organizations, which were not included in the previous regressions, appear to
earn nearly $3 million per patent (see column 4). Previous estimates based on renewal data have also
reported exceptionally high patent value for Japanese patents and a majority of the foreign patents in
this sample are from Japanese inventors.9 However, there may be a good reason why these estimates
may not be reliable. The model assumes a constant rate of depreciation for the profit flow from a
patent. It may well be that this assumption does not hold for foreign patenters. For example, foreign
patenters may apply for a patent long before they are ready to market the invention in the United States.
U.S. priority rules require that a U.S. patent be filed within a year after the invention is used or publicly
disclosed, but typically a firm markets an invention first to its domestic market, only later rolling out
sales and production to foreign markets. In this case, the pattern of profit flow for foreign patentees
may diverge substantially from one with constant depreciation. There is some evidence that the
estimate is off in this regard: the estimated depreciation rate in column 4 is nearly twice that of the
other regressions. To control for this possibility, I repeat the same regression in column 5, but hold the
depreciation rate constant at 15% per annum. With this change, the estimated mean net present value is
$107,906, just modestly larger than the mean present value estimate for U.S. public firms.
Table 4 reports the results of separate regressions for different technology classes, similar to
estimates for French technology classes by Schankerman (1998) and estimates for German technology
classes by Lanjouw (1998). The technology categories I use were developed by Hall et al. (2001) and
are based on the USPTO patent classification system. Contrary to the European studies, I find the
highest mean patent values in chemicals and pharmaceuticals and the lowest values in computers,
communications and “other.” Schankerman finds that pharmaceuticals and chemicals have the lowest
mean values and he attributes this to price regulation for pharmaceuticals in France. Lanjouw finds a
middling value for pharmaceutical patents. Note also that although computers and communications
patents have the second lowest mean value, they also have the second highest median value. This
suggests that perhaps the mean values are low because there are just fewer “blockbuster” patents in this
technology.
9 I also ran regressions by nationality, however, after Japan the numbers were too small to obtain reliable results.

13 - Bessen – Value of U.S. Patents

3.2 Patent Value and Patent Characteristics
As noted in the introduction, many researchers have related patent characteristics to patent value.
My model permits some of these associations to be quantified. Table 5 includes patent characteristics in
the regression. Column 1 shows characteristics that depend on choices made by the patentee. A
patentee, aware that some patents are more valuable than others, may take efforts to make sure that the
patent is more successfully enforced. These efforts at patent “refinement” include litigating, making
more citations and claims in the patent application, and, possibly, re-issuing the patent. A re-issuance
procedure permits a patentee to modify claim language, in some cases increasing the scope of the
claim.
Each of these actions has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, suggesting that patent
value is, to some extent, endogenous. Previous literature has also found positive and significant
relationships between patent claims and patent value as reported by survey respondents and between
patent citations made and reported value (Harhoff et al. 2003a). Using the coefficients in the Table, I
can quantify all of these relationships. The last column of the table reports the percentage increase in
profit flow associated with an incremental increase in the variable (e.g., one additional citation). A
litigated patent is, all else equal, nearly six times more valuable. At the mean, a litigated patent is worth
nearly half a million dollars. This corresponds well with what we know about litigation costs for
plaintiffs, since patentees should only litigate those patents that are more valuable than litigation costs.
In 1994, according to a survey of intellectual property lawyers (AIPLA 1994), the median cost of a
patent lawsuit was $190,000 through the discovery phase (after which many suits are settled) and
$301,000 through trial (costs have escalated substantially since then). A re-issued patent, all else equal,
is nearly three times as valuable as other patents. Each additional citation made increases value about
1% and each claim increases value about 2%.
In column 2, I break out citations made to an assignee’s own patents (self citations) from those
made to others’ patents and I add patent citations received. It appears most of the value realized
through citations made occurs from citations made to the patentee’s own patents. This may be an
indicator of “fencing” or “thicket building” behavior (Hall et al. 2005) where patentees strengthen their
patents by also patenting related technologies or alternative technologies. Each self-cite increases
patent value about 3%.
Since Trajtenberg (1990), researchers have used the number of citations that a patent receives as
an indicator of patent or invention value. Previous research has found correlations between patent
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citations received and patent value reported in surveys (Harhoff et al. 2003) and between patent
citations received and firm market value (Hall et al. 2005). My coefficient on citations received is
significantly associated with patent value and this statistic does seem to have greater statistical
significance than the coefficients on citations made and claims. The economic significance of an
additional citation received is also greater—an additional citation increases estimated profit flow by
about 5% in this specification.
Column 3 drops the litigation and reissue dummies and adds statistics (calculated in the NBER
database) for generality and originality. Generality and originality are measures suggested by
Trajtenberg et al. (1997) that range from zero to one and capture the technological diversity of citing
and cited patents, respectively. If the patents that cite the subject patent come from a large (small)
number of technology classes, then generality will be high (low). If patent citations correspond to use
of the technology in the cited patent, then high generality suggests that the cited invention is a general
purpose technology with many applications. Correspondingly, if a patent cites other patents from a
large (small) number of technology classes, then it will have a high (low) originality index. Both of
these measures have statistically significant coefficients, with a positive coefficient for generality and a
negative one for originality.
Column 4 explores non-linearity in the effect of citations received by adding the square of this
variable. The negative and significant coefficient on the squared term suggests diminishing returns to
this effect. At the sample median (four citations received), an additional patent citation received
increases profit flow by about 7% under this specification.
These results confirm general findings about the correlation between citation statistics and patent
value in the literature. But my results also suggest that these associations have relatively small
economic significance. At the sample mean, for example, an additional patent citation received
corresponds to an increase in patent value of between three and five thousand dollars. This is
substantially less than the effect suggested by some other research. For instance, Hall et al. (2005)
estimate the relationship between firm market value and patent citations. Their results imply that at the
sample mean, an additional citation received on a single patent corresponds to an increase in firm value
of about $327,000 ($512,000 at the sample median).10 This large difference likely just means that we
are measuring different things. Hall et al. measure the relationship between a patent citation and the
10 They report that an increase of one citation/patent for all the patents a firm owns increases firm market value by 2.7% at
the mean. Mean market value is $916.33m and mean patent stock is 75.72, yielding an increase of $327,000 in market
value with one citation on one patent.
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value of the technology to the firm generally; I measure specifically the effect of a patent citation on
the value of the rents generated by a patent per se. As noted above, the value of the technology may be
much greater than the value of the patent.
In addition, my estimates can be used to evaluate the portion of total variance in patent rents that
can be “explained” by citation statistics. Given a vector of citation statistics, X which are a subset of
the right hand variables, X, and given coefficients on these citation statistics of

, the portion of

variance accounted for by these statistics is
var
var

X
X

2

.

I calculated this quantity for the various specifications in Table 5 for all of the citation statistics
and just for citations received. In no case did the portion of variance explained exceed five percent. In
other words, as other researchers have also concluded, patent citation statistics are correlated with
patent value, but they are very “noisy signals.” This analysis indicates just how noisy they are.
Another way of looking at this is to examine just the most highly cited patents. Of the top 10
percent of patents ranked by citations received in 1991 (with 15 or more citations), 37% were not
renewed to term. Among the top 5 percent (with 21 or more citations), 32% were not renewed to term.
Thus even among the most highly cited patents, many are not even worth the full set of renewal fees,
after accounting for depreciation.
This analysis emphasizes not only that patent citations are “noisy,” but also that care must be
taken in interpreting the meaning of correlations involving citation statistics. Patent citations may be a
good (but noisy) indicator of technology value, but they appear to be only only weakly related to patent
value. For this reason, they are not meaningful as a measure of patent “quality.”

3.3 Estimates for Public Manufacturing Firms
Table 6 reports regressions for the panel of patents granted to public firms from 1985 through
1991. It is important to check estimates over a range of cohorts, to make sure that temporary
disequilibria do not affect the estimates. Column 1 shows a simple regression, comparable to those
used in the 1991 sample. The coefficients and the value estimates are quite similar to those obtained for
large entities in 1991 in Table 2 and for publicly listed firms in 1991 in Table 3. This provides some
assurance that temporary effects do not appear to exert much effect on the estimates.
It is also possible that patent values may have changed over time. To test this, I ran the regression
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in Column 1 with dummy variables for each grant year and then again with dummies for each
application year. These dummy coefficients are shown in Figure 1 (normalized to equal 1 in 1985).
These suggest that patent value increased modestly during the mid-1980s and then leveled off. This is
consistent with the notion that the creation of a centralized appeals court for patents in 1982 (the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) may have “strengthened” patents, thus increasing their value. This is
also roughly contemporaneous with the well-known acceleration in patenting rates, which has been a
subject of several studies (Kortum and Lerner 1999, Hall and Ziedonis 2001, Henry and Turner 2005,
Sanyal 2005). Unfortunately, estimates of patent value for years before 1983 are unreliable because of
sample size and data quality problems.
The remaining columns of Table 6 explore firm characteristics. In Column 2, patent value
increases with firm R&D spending. This is consistent with the view that more valuable patents are
correlated with more valuable technology. However, the larger the patent stock of the firm, all else
equal, the smaller the mean patent value. This suggests that there are diminishing returns to patenting
—patent values decrease as more patents are obtained, all else equal. Column 2 also includes a dummy
variable for “new” firms, that is, firms that have been publicly listed for fewer than 5 years. It is
sometimes argued that patents are particularly valuable to new firms, helping them secure financing.
This regression does not support that view, finding significantly smaller patent value for new firms.
Column 3 reports industry dummies. Computer and electronics industries have the largest patent
value, and “other” (the omitted category) has the lowest.

4 Analysis
4.1 Comparisons to other estimates
Table 7 compares my estimates to those obtained by other researchers for both US and European
patents. Based on the above analysis, we should expect substantial differences depending on the
particular population of patents being compared. Barney (2002) uses the 1986 cohort of patents granted
and obtains slightly smaller estimates. Serrano (2005) estimates of patent value using both renewal and
re-assignment data for a group of U.S. organizations that do not patent heavily. In 1992 dollars he
obtains a mean value of $48,000 and a median value of $17,000. These are smaller, but Serrano’s
sample is likely weighted more toward small firms, who, as we have seen, have patents with smaller
values.
Putnam (1996) uses a sample of patents that were also filed in one or more other countries. Using
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data on international filings (in a model similar to the renewal model), he estimates that patents that
were successfully filed in the US in 1974 that were also filed abroad were worth $188,000 in 1992
dollars. In general, patents that are filed in multiple countries tend to be much more valuable than
patents that are not, so it is not surprising that Putnam’s mean estimate is substantially higher than the
others. Using Putnam’s data it is possible to impute the mean value of all US patents, including those
that were only filed domestically. This figure is about $79,000.11 Thus all of these estimates of US
mean patent value are roughly consistent.
The estimated value of European patents is also substantially smaller than the US estimates.
Converted to 1992 U.S. dollars, the mean values range from about $2,000 to $32,000, with an average
of about $16,000. However, it is not surprising that these values are so much larger because the U.S.
market is much larger than any of the national European markets. On the other hand, the US estimates
are significantly smaller than survey-based estimates of the value of European patents (Harhoff et al.,
2003a, Gambardella et al. 2005). However, this may simply reflect that survey respondents may be
estimating the value of the technology rather than the value of the patent per se.12
One concern about estimates of patent value based on renewal data is that patentee renewal
decisions do not directly reveal the values of the most valuable patents. All of the most valuable patents
in the upper tail of the distribution are renewed to full term. This means that although estimates of
median value are based on an observed distribution, estimates of mean patent value are based on an
extrapolation, assuming that the distribution observed among expiring patents (in my case, a log normal
distribution) is the same distribution among the most highly valued patents. This means that if the true
distribution is not log normal, these estimates may be off.
In a separate paper (Bessen 2006), I address the valuation of the upper tail by reviewing estimates
of patent value obtained from analysis of firm market value. This analysis suggests that the estimates
based on renewal data do not substantially understate patent value for these firms.

11 Putnam (1996) reports that in 1974, 36% of US patents were also filed in another country (Table 3.3). Patents granted in
the US that were also filed abroad were worth $188,000 in 1992 dollars. Putnam also estimates that in aggregate,
domestic patents (estimated for Germany) add about 5% to the aggregate value of all international patents held in a
country (p. 129). Worldwide rights associated with each US international patent was $609,600 in 1974. Then the mean
value of all patents should be ($188,355 + .05*$609,600)*no. of int’l patents/total no. of patents = ($188,355 +
.05*$609,600)*.36 = $78,800. Alternatively, if the domestic-only patents are assumed to be worth $20,000, then the
mean patent value is about $80,000.
12 Survey questions ask inventors at what value the patent’s owner would be willing to part with the patent. However, it
may be hard for respondents to mentally separate parting with the patent from parting with the technology, since firms
may be unlikely to sell a patent without also selling the technical know how, etc. and since firms may abandon
production and sale of the technology themselves when they sell the patent rights.
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4.2 Estimates of the Patent Subsidy
Patent rents represent the “reward” that patents afford inventors. Mark Schankerman (1998)
suggests that this reward can be considered as equivalent to an R&D subsidy. He asks what subsidy
would be needed in order to induce firms to make the same investment in R&D as they are induced to
make by patents. He suggests that the ratio of a patentee’s aggregate patent value (= patent rents)
divided by the associated R&D expenditure can be considered an upper bound estimate of this
“equivalent subsidy rate.”13
Several of the studies cited in Table 7 have used those estimates of patent value to calculate
equivalent subsidy rates (Pakes 1986, Pakes and Schankerman 1986, Lanjouw 1998, Schankerman
1998). To obtain equivalent subsidy rates, the value per patent listed in Table 7 can be multiplied by the
ratio of successful patent applications to dollars of R&D. These studies obtain estimates for patent
cohorts from the 1970s that range from 4% to 35% (see Addendum to Table 8), averaging about 18%.
However, these ratios were calculated using aggregate national data (aggregate patent counts and
aggregate R&D) pro-rated to the country where the patent was granted (e.g., R&D performed in the
US, Germany, etc. is allocated to French patents). Unfortunately, estimates derived from aggregate data
may not accurately represent the subsidy that a modern firm can expect to get on its R&D investment.
In particular, the ratios of patent grants per R&D dollar used in these studies are quite high (also shown
in the addendum to Table 8). For example, Schankerman’s (1998) figures for patents per million
dollars R&D ($92) range from 6 to 12.14 However, averages for actual patenting rates for Compustat
firms are below 0.5, an order of magnitude smaller!15 There are several reasons why estimates based on
aggregate data may be misleading. First, the numerator in these estimates includes patents assigned to
individuals and small inventors who are not included in the R&D data.16 Moreover, these estimates use
rather old R&D statistics (mostly from the 1970s) that tend to under-report R&D because accounting
regulations did not require reporting and because R&D tax credits did not provide incentives for

13 Schankerman (1998) and Lanjouw (1998) point out that this may be an upper bound estimate for several reasons. There
may be diminishing returns to R&D. A cash subsidy may be relatively more valuable to risk averse investors, so they
might require a smaller equivalent subsidy. Also, this analysis does not take into account strategic interaction; to the
extent each firm’s patents reduce the rents that other firms earn, the subsidy needed in a world without patents would
also be less.
14 See Table 6. Mark Schankerman has confirmed in private communication (11/28/2004) that the patents to R&D ratio
reported in his table should be 10 times larger than the printed figures.
15 For firms with over $1 million in R&D spending in 1991, the simple ratio of successful patent applications to deflated
R&D has a median of .14, and mean of .40 and a top percentile at 6.0.
16 In the US, for example, individual inventors are not included in NSF surveys and small private companies without
separate R&D labs are unlikely to be surveyed, especially in the older surveys used in these studies.
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separate reporting.17 Finally, these studies use ad hoc methods to pro-rate R&D spending across
countries. Given the limitations of the data, these methods are useful for getting rough estimates that
correspond roughly to something like the subsidy provided by worldwide patents (not just the patents
of the subject country), but the exact nature of what is measured is a bit unclear and the assumptions
behind the apportionment methods used are not discussed.
Firm level data permit a more representative calculation that compares the value of the patents a
firm obtains in the US to the level of that firm’s R&D. Table 8 shows a variety of estimates calculated
at different levels of aggregation. The first two rows display aggregate data for all U.S. patentees, using
the estimated value per patent from Table 2, Column 1. The aggregate value of patents granted in 1991
to U.S. patentees was about $4.4 billion in 1992 dollars. I calculated the corresponding R&D
investment using data from the National Science Foundation (NSF) survey of U.S. firms. Since the
patents granted in 1991 were applied for over many years, Column 4 displays a weighted sum of real
R&D spending where the weights are allocated based on the proportion of 1991 patents applied for in
each year R&D was performed. Column 6 displays the equivalent subsidy rate. The first row shows the
calculation using all industrial R&D, the second row shows the rate using just company-funded R&D.
These estimates are within the range of some of the estimates based on European data, but at the
bottom of that range.
The remaining rows reports estimates using data on firm R&D spending for publicly listed firms
in the Compustat database. These estimates are conditional on firms’ choosing to patent (about 15% of
R&D is performed by firms that do not patent). The third row reports the calculation for all publicly
listed firms matched to patent data in 1991. The R&D figure in Column 4 is a weighted sum of each
firm’s R&D expenditure for the application year for each patent granted in 1991, the weights
apportioning each year’s R&D equally across all patents for that year. The patent value comes from
Table 3. Even though the value per patent is higher, the estimate of the equivalent subsidy rate is much
smaller, 2.9%. The main reason for this is that the ratio of patents to R&D is much lower (see Column
5) because so much more of measured R&D is performed by public firms. The fourth row repeats this
calculation using the sample of patents from publicly listed manufacturing firms for 1985 – 91, using
the mean patent value estimates from Table 6, Columns 1. This estimate of the equivalent subsidy rate
is also 2.9%.
Thus firm level data suggests that the equivalent subsidy provided by US patents to public US
17 U.S. accounting regulations for R&D were introduced in 1974. R&D tax credits were introduced in the U.S. in 1981, in
France in 1983 (see Hall and van Reenen 2000, Mansfield 1993).
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firms is about 3%. Note that this is the subsidy provided only by firms’ US patents—they will earn
additional subsidies from patents obtained on the same inventions in other countries. Thumbnail
calculations (see fn. 11) suggest that the total subsidy provided by worldwide patents may be two or
three times larger, somewhat more consistent with the concept measured in the studies by Lanjouw,
Pakes and Schankerman.
Arora et al. (2003) also estimate an equivalent subsidy ratio using a structural model
incorporating survey data and firm-level R&D data. Their estimate of 17% also represents the return on
worldwide patent rights, so it, too, is not directly comparable.

4.3 Small Patentees and the Market for Patents
One surprisingly persistent result is that small patentees—individuals, non-profits and firms with
fewer than 500 employees—have patent values that are far smaller on average than the values of
patents owned by large firms. In the 1991 sample, the median of large firm patent values was about five
times larger; in the panel of manufacturing firms, large firm patent values were nearly three times as
large. Moreover, these differences persist across technologies, industries, and assignee types. Arora et
al. (2003) also find a large disparity between large and small US firms. Gustafsson (2005) finds a large
disparity in patent value between individual and firm patents in Finland. On the other hand,
Gambardella et al. (2005) find that individuals and small firms claim higher patent values than large
firms in a survey. This, however, may reflect greater optimism on the part of smaller inventors rather
than greater actual value.
This finding of sharply lower value for small inventors contradicts a popular view that small
patentees have particularly valuable patents. It also contradicts the conclusion of Allison et al. (2004),
who argue that since patents need to be valuable in order to be litigated, and since small entity patents
are more likely to be litigated, then small entity patents must be more valuable. I find that litigation is
correlated with patent value, but that small entities still have patents with sharply lower values on
average.18
There are at least three possible explanations for lower value realized by small inventors:
18 If small size is correlated with litigation and if litigation is correlated with value, it does not logically follow that small
size is necessarily correlated with value. The probability of litigation is determined by more than just the value of the
patents involved. In a more complete model, large firms obtain more patents, but their probability of disputes with other
firms does not go up proportionately, so their rate of litigation per patent is smaller (Bessen and Meurer 2005). Then
large firms may have both lower litigation rates per patent and greater value per patent. Note that the substantially higher
rate of litigation per patent for small entities also suggests that the value disparity cannot be explained by lower litigation
costs for large firms.
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1. Small inventors may have greater costs of monitoring and enforcement as Lanjouw and
Schankerman (2004b) argue. They may be less able to settle disputes and litigation may be
relatively more expensive. Of course, lawyers on contingency and patent litigation firms such as
REFAC may alleviate some of this disadvantage, but perhaps small firms still face greater postissue costs.
However, this does not seem to be an adequate explanation for the lower mean costs of
small entity patents for the following reason: faced with larger post-issue costs, small inventors
will rationally only patent relatively more profitable inventions. Given a lognormal distribution
of patent values, greater post-issue costs should actually increase the observed mean patent
value even after taking those costs into account.19 Moreover, a well-functioning market for
technology should allow small inventors to sell their patents to firms who have more efficient
monitoring and enforcement.
2. Small inventors may patent inventions that are inherently less valuable to society.
Individuals may be motivated to patent for non-pecuniary reasons, such as vanity. Macleod et
al. (2003) find that British inventors in the 19th century often patented inventions that did not or
could not work (e.g., perpetual motion machines), suggesting non-pecuniary motivation. Also,
individual inventors may be manipulated by unscrupulous patent agents or they may be riskloving. And the serendipity of discovery may lead them to make less valuable inventions—e.g.,
individuals may be more familiar with pets than with petroleum cracking, and pet-related
patents may be inherently less valuable.
However, these factors can only explain a portion of the discrepancy. The gap between
large and small patentee’s values holds for private corporations, public corporations and for all
technology classes. Indeed, specialized chemical engineering firms have held some of the
important patents on petroleum cracking. Moreover, there are other reasons to expect a priori
that small patentees should have more valuable patents on average rather than less valuable
ones. Arora and Merges (2004) argue that stronger “property rights unleash the high-powered
incentives of arm’s-length contracting.” With well-functioning technology markets, small
patentees should have greater incentives than inventors in large integrated firms, therefore they
should invent more valuable patents.
19 With highly skewed distributions of patent value such as the lognormal distribution, an increase in a lower truncation
threshold increases the mean value of the truncated distribution by more than the increase in the threshold, as long as the
threshold is sufficiently large.
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3. Small inventors may not be able to realize as much value from their patents because
commercialization often requires substantial complementary assets and the markets for
technology do not always work well. Large firms have the R&D labs, the manufacturing
facilities and the marketing channels to bring inventions to market. Because of this, large firms
can directly realize greater profits from the ability of patents to exclude others from the
marketplace. Small inventors lack these complementary assets, however, if technology markets
worked well, then small inventors would still be able to realize similar value. They could
license or sell their technology to a firm that had the necessary assets or they could raise the
funds to acquire these assets themselves.
But contracting over technology is notoriously difficult and markets for technology are
notoriously incomplete. These markets face a serious “lemons” problem: buyers often have
little information about the quality of the technologies offered for sale or license. Private
information can lead to a failure to make mutually beneficial contracts. Although patents may
facilitate contracting at the margin (Arora and Ceccagnoli 2006, Gans et al. 2002), the general
picture of markets for technology may be one where small firms and independent inventors
have difficulty capturing the value of their inventions. Indeed, in a large survey of European
patentees, Gambardella et al. (2006) find that only 61% of patentees who wanted to license their
patents were able to do so. Caves et al. (1983) find that licensors typically realize less than half
the value of their technologies.
Thus imperfect technology markets seem to be the explanation that is most consistent with the
evidence. Of course, there are distinct industry niches where vertical dis-integration works well and
patents may combine with other factors to facilitate arm’s length contracting. Hall and Ziedonis (2001)
find evidence that patents played an important role in facilitating the rise of “fabless” semiconductor
design firms who outsource all manufacturing. I identified 111 patents issued to these semiconductor
design firms in the 1985-1991 panel of public firms.20 Of these, 85% (94) were renewed to full term,
suggesting that these were, indeed, valuable patents. But this is the exception that proves the rule. Most
small firms (not all of the semiconductor design firms were small) do not realize such value from their
patents and so this sort of vertical dis-integration may be atypical, dependent on idiosyncratic features
of this industry. Indeed, even in the fabless semiconductor example, technological changes played a
20 Thanks to Rosemarie Ziedonis for sharing her data with me.
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role: Hall and Ziedonis note that in addition to patents, MOS (metal oxide semiconductor) production
technology facilitated their rise.
If this interpretation is correct, then the low value of small entity patents reflects imperfections in
the market for technology. Patents by themselves may only make these markets slightly more efficient
and the ability of patents to unleash high-powered incentives may be limited to those niches where
patents and technologies combine to facilitate arm’s length contracting over technology.

5. Conclusion
I have used U.S. patent renewal data to estimate the value of U.S. patents to different groups of
domestic patentees and to analyze some of the determinants of patent value. Among my findings:
I estimate that patents granted to U.S. patentees in 1991 were worth about $78,000 in the
mean ($7,000 in the median) to their owners. This is substantially larger than estimates made
using similar data for European patents. Estimates for a panel of patents granted to public
manufacturing firms were higher, about $113,000 in the mean and $18,000 in the median.
Despite this larger per patent value, I find that the ratio of patent value to R&D—a
measure of the subsidy that patents provide to R&D investment—is only about 3%.
Nevertheless, in aggregate, the value of U.S. patents granted to U.S. owners in 1991 was over
$4 billion. This is large, but it is substantially smaller than other government programs to
encourage R&D. For example, direct Federal funding of industrial R&D in 1991 was over $26
billion.
There are large differences in patent value across different groups of patentees. Small
entities—individuals, corporations with fewer than 500 employees and non-profit organizations
—have patent values that are on average less than half as large as the values obtained by large
corporations. Contrary to lore, patents do not seem to work particularly well for small inventors
and this may be evidence of serious imperfections in the market for patents.
I quantify the association between litigation and patent citation statistics and patent value.
A litigated patent is worth nearly six times as much as a non-litigated patent. An additional
patent citation received increases patent value by 4-7%. Although patent citations are
significantly correlated with patent value, they only explain a small portion of the variance in
patent value, so they are not meaningful measures of patent value of patent quality. Patent
citation statistics may be more meaningful as measures of the value of the underlying
technology.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
Percent Expired During
4th Year
ALL

8th Year

12th Year

Percent

Percent

Full term

Small

Number

20.21

20.95

17.31

41.52

29.33

94,342

Unassigned & individuals

36.05

26.14

15.43

22.38

88.24

17,786

Non-public organizations

18.21

20.41

17.00

44.38

45.34

17,229

Publicly listed firms

13.70

19.37

16.58

50.35

9.77

21,904

Foreign organizations

17.43

19.66

18.78

44.13

2.34

37,423

Small

32.22

25.72

16.66

25.40

100.00

26,768

Large

15.46

19.06

17.57

47.91

0.00

67,574

Chemical

19.10

21.19

18.63

41.08

15.73

18,175

Computers & communications

11.74

17.46

17.56

53.24

14.51

9,816

Drugs & medical

20.11

20.66

15.13

44.10

36.87

8,288

Electrical & electronic

16.28

19.28

17.45

46.99

18.91

16,481

Mechanical

21.65

21.62

17.72

39.00

31.73

21,561

Other

27.11

23.22

16.34

33.33

51.82

20,021

814

1,562

2,327

Assignee type

PTO Entity Status

Technology Category

Mean fee ($92)
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Table 2. Regressions for U.S. Patentees by Size Status
All
1
Small entity, year 4

Small Entities
2

Large Entities
3

-1.92 (0.04)

Entity change (small to large)

3.78 (0.11)

Entity change (large to small)

0.54 (0.10)

Constant

8.45 (0.09)

6.72 (0.09)

8.37 (0.09)

1.86 (0.05)

1.93 (0.07)

1.88 (0.06)

0.14 (0.01)

0.16 (0.01)

0.13 (0.01)

d
Median net present value
Mean net present value
Number of observations
Log L

3.93 (0.14)
0.54 (0.10)

7,174.6

2,942.9

14,310.2

78,167.7

70,100.2

105,916.2

56,816

24,015

32,801

-72,444.1

-31,600.7

-40,809.9

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Entity change dummy variables reflect change in status between the fourth year
and final year. Patent values in 1992 $ and discounted at 10%.
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Table 3. Regressions by Assignee Type
U.S. Assignee
Unassigned or
individual
1
Small entity,
year 4

Non-listed
Organization
2

Publicly Listed
Firm
3

Foreign
Organization
4

Foreign
Organization
with d = .15
5

-1.56 (0.06)

-1.39 (0.06)

-1.27 (0.11)

-1.94 (0.07)

-1.54 (0.04)

Entity change
(small to large)

3.91 (0.19)

3.53 (0.20)

2.89 (0.23)

4.55 (0.24)

3.34 (0.13)

Entity change
(large to small)

0.83 (0.18)

0.64 (0.16)

0.92 (0.20)

1.61 (0.25)

0.89 (0.16)

Constant

7.87 (0.13)

8.71 (0.22)

8.38 (0.12)

9.93 (0.18)

8.43 (0.01)

1.79 (0.08)

2.06 (0.13)

1.80 (0.07)

2.82 (0.11)

1.93 (0.01)

0.14 (0.01)

0.16 (0.02)

0.13 (0.01)

0.27 (0.01)

0.15 --

d
Median net present
value
Mean net present
value
Number of
observations
Log L

2,588.9

19,206.3

49,297.7

62,326.5

16,421.5

25,597.6

206,286.3

90,787.8

2,905,760.7

107,906.3

17,786

17,229

21,904

37,423

37,526

-23,338.6

-21,770.5

-26,962.9

-48,269.4

-48,443.2

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Column 5 fixes the depreciation rate at 15%. Entity change dummy variables
reflect change in status between the fourth year and final year. Patent values in 1992 $ and discounted at 10%.
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Table 4. Estimates for Technological Categories for Patents held by U.S. Patentees
Median Net Present
Value

Mean Net Present
Value

Chemical

33,856

497,200

Computers & Communications

21,287

45,247

Drugs & Medical

12,692

120,419

Electrical & Electronic

11,928

68,459

Mechanical

8,171

86,033

Others

4,573

38,626

Note: Technology categories are from Hall et al. (2001). Patent values in 1992 $ and discounted at 10%.
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Table 5. Regressions with Patent Characteristics
Small entity, year 4
Entity change (small to large)
Entity change (large to small)
Litigation
Reissued
Citations made
self citations
citations to others'patents
No. of claims
Citations received
Cites rec'
2 ^2 / 1000
Generality
Originality
Constant
d
Number of observations
Log L

1
-1.89
3.65
0.44
1.77
1.02
0.007

(0.04)
(0.11)
(0.10)
(0.132)
(0.179)
(0.001)

0.017 (0.001)

8.13 (0.09)
1.85 (0.05)
0.14 (0.01)
56,816
-72,014.8

2
-1.38
3.06
0.55
1.36
0.84

(0.04)
(0.12)
(0.12)
(0.172)
(0.235)

0.027
0.000
0.006
0.046

(0.005)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.003)

3
-1.84 (0.06)
3.51 (0.15)
0.38 (0.11)

4
-1.82 (0.03)
3.57 (0.10)
0.48 (0.09)

0.004 (0.001)

8.07 (0.11)
1.85 (0.07)
0.14 (0.01)
38,236
-46,816.4

0.013 (0.001)
0.039 (0.003)
0.173 (0.04)
-0.106 (0.04)
7.97 (0.14)
1.80 (0.09)
0.14 (0.01)
48,990
-60,891.0

0.069 (0.003)
-0.405 (0.048)

Proportional
Increase

487%
179%
1%
3%
0%
2%
4 - 7%

8.05 (0.07)
1.83 (0.05)
0.14 (0.01)
56,816
-71,331.4

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Litigation dummy is one for patents that were the main patent in one or more
lawsuits filed by 1999 and listed in Derwent’s Litalert service. Citation statistics are from the NBER patent database and are
described in Hall et al. (2001). Entity change dummy variables reflect change in status between the fourth year and final
year.
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Table 6. Firm Characteristics for U.S. Public Manufacturing Firms, 1985 - 91
1
Small entity

-0.93 (0.05)

2
-0.99 (0.05)

New firm

-0.08 (0.03)

Ln R&D

0.21 (0.01)

Ln employment

0.01 (0.01)

Ln patent stock

-0.29 (0.01)

3
-0.99 (0.05)

Industry
Pharmaceuticals

0.35 (0.03)

Electrical & instrument

0.34 (0.02)

Electronic & computer

0.85 (0.02)

Metals & transportation

0.08 (0.02)

Constant
d
Median net present value

8.69 (0.06)

9.04 (0.07)

8.40 (0.05)

1.87 (0.03)

1.85 (0.03)

1.84 (0.03)

0.16 (0.00)

0.16 (0.00)

0.16 (0.00)

18,010

17,934

17,786

Mean net present value

113,066

112,695

110,976

Number of observations

107,364

107,364

107,364

-133,549.7

-132,876.7

-132,387.2

Log L

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The new firm dummy is one if the firm has been publicly listed for fewer than
5 years. R&D is deflated R&D stock, employment is in thousands, and patent stock is calculated using the perpetual
inventory methods at a 15% depreciation. Patent values in 1992 $, discounted at 10%.
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Table 7. Comparison of Estimates of Patent Value
Patent value (92 $US)

Patent
Issue Year

Patent
Country

Group

1991

US

1985-91

Barney (2002)

Study

median

mean

All US patentees

7,175

78,168

US

US public firms,
manufacturing

18,010

113,067

1986

US

All

5,849

61,896

Serrano (2005)

1983-2002

US

Small business
patentees

17,361

47,456

Putnam (1996)

1974

US

Also filed abroad

188,355

All (imputed)

78,800
1,656

This paper

Other US Studies

European Studies
Baudry and Dumont
(2006)
Gustafsson (2005)
Lanjouw (1998)

2002

France

All

1970-89

Finland

All

27,704

30,833

1975

Germany

computers

7,235

13,027

textiles

4,721

9,695

engines

18,390

27,571

pharmaceuticals

5,850

15,219

pharmaceuticals

2,607

6,893

chemicals

2,548

7,942

mechanical

4,683

24,165

electronics*

5,049

31,704

1967-80
Schankerman (1998)

Pakes (1986)

Pakes and
Schankerman (1986)

1970

France

1951-79

France

All

853

9,000

1950-74

UK

All

2,424

11,758

1952-72

Germany

All

9,993

25,841

1970

UK

All

2,974

11,128

France

All

1,354

10,638

Germany

All

9,126

30,564

* In Schankerman (1998) Japanese patents are excluded from the electronics group. In Pakes and Schankerman (1986) the
values given are for patents in their fifth year.
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Table 8. Equivalent Subsidy Rate
1

Patentees

2

3

4

5

6

Aggregate
Patent Value
(mill. $92)

R&D Source
(allocated over patent
application years)

Deflated
R&D
(mill. $92)

Patents /
$ mill.
R&D

Equivalent
Subsidy
Rate

$ 115,891.6

0.49

3.8%

1991 Sample
All U.S. patentees

$ 4,441.2

NSF Total U.S. R&D

All U.S. patentees

$ 4,441.2

NSF U.S. Company R&D

$ 84,291.2

0.93

5.3%

Publicly listed U.S. Firms

$ 1,988.6

Firm R&D Compustat

$ 69,751.7

0.31

2.9%

$ 12,757.9

Firm R&D Compustat

$ 446,597.1

0.25

2.9%

Patents /
$m R&D

Reported
ESR

1985 - 91 Panel
Publicly listed U.S.
manufacturing firms

Addendum: Estimates from European Patents during 1970s
Study
Pakes and
Schankerman
(1986)
Lanjouw
(1998)

Cohort
year

Nation

1970

UK

All

5.16

26.4%

France

All

6.44

21.7%

Germany

All

1.85

15.2%

Germany

computers

4.47

10.4%

textiles

23.26

38.3%

engines

1.37

5.7%

pharmaceuticals

2.28

6.8%

pharmaceuticals

5.99

4.1%

chemicals

9.14

7.2%

mechanical

12.48

29.9%

electronics (exc. Japan)

11.22

35.4%

7.60

18.3%

1975

1967-80
Schankerman
(1998)

MEAN

1970

France

Industry

Note: Estimates for firms are conditional on firms choosing to patent. Patents per R&D for the European studies is
computed from reported (or implied) patent grants per R&D converted to the equivalent ratio for 1992 U.S. dollars. Mark
Schankerman has confirmed in private communication (11/28/2004) that the patents to R&D ratio reported in his 1998
paper should be 10 times larger than the printed figures. Estimates for the equivalent subsidy rate for Pakes and
Schankerman (1986) have been adjusted to represent value at grant date as described in Schankerman (1998). Equivalent
subsidy rates for Schankerman (1998) use only business R&D.
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Figure 1. Year Effects
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